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Insurance Corporation as Receiver for
Security Savings Bank

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

FEDERAL DEPOSIT)	Case No.
INSURANCE CORPORATION)	
AS RECEIVER FOR SECURITY)	
SAVINGS BANK,)	
)	COMPLAINT
Plaintiff,)	
)	JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
vs.)	
)	
KELLY JONES, STEPHEN)	
DERVENIS, and THOMAS)	
PROCOPIO,)	
)	
Defendants.)	

1 Plaintiff, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as Receiver
2 for Security Savings Bank, Henderson, Nevada ("FDIC-R") complains and
3 alleges against defendants as follows:

4 **I. INTRODUCTION**

5 1. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC")
6 brings this lawsuit in its capacity as Receiver for Security Savings Bank (the
7 "Bank") pursuant to authority granted by 12 U.S.C. § 1821.

8 2. The FDIC-R seeks to recover damages in excess of \$13.1
9 million because Kelly Jones ("Jones"), Stephen Dervenis ("Dervenis"), and
10 Thomas Procopio ("Procopio") (collectively the "Defendants") – three of the
11 Bank's former officers and/or directors – underwrote, recommended,
12 and/or voted to approve at least seven high-risk commercial real estate
13 ("CRE") and acquisition, development, and construction ("ADC") loans
14 (collectively, the "Loan Transactions") in violation of the Bank's lending
15 policies and clear principles of safety and soundness.

16 3. Defendants' roles as underwriters of the Bank's loans
17 required that, before recommending a loan for approval, they ensured the
18 loan was properly documented, complied with the loan policy, was
19 adequately supported, and demonstrated a strong likelihood of repayment.
20 Defendants were further required to provide accurate and full disclosures
21 to the Loan Committee members to enable them to make informed
22 decisions regarding the requested credits. As approvers and
23 recommenders of the loans, Defendants had a duty to ensure compliance
24 with the Bank's loan policies and safe and sound banking practices, and to
25 make informed decisions that were in the best interests of the Bank.
26 Specifically, Defendants were required to ensure that the borrowers were
27 credit worthy, that there was a clear source of repayment, and that the loan
28 would not result in unnecessary risk to the Bank.

1 4. Defendants wholly abdicated each and every one of these
2 responsibilities by repeatedly disregarding the Bank's loan policies and
3 safe and sound banking practices, including causing the Bank to loan
4 millions of dollars to borrowers who had no adequate means to repay the
5 loans in the event the proposed projects failed or underperformed. Each of
6 the Loan Transactions was a loan participation – *i.e.*, a loan that was
7 originated by another bank, but funded by two or more banks. Although
8 these loans **required** independent underwriting, Defendants failed to
9 conduct complete, independent underwriting on a single loan, instead
10 relying extensively on the underwriting of the lead bank.

11 5. Defendants knew or should have known that such
12 reliance was reckless and represented indifference to their duties to the
13 Bank. By these acts and omissions, Defendants created obvious risks of
14 injury to the Bank from specific loans that they knew or were reckless for
15 not knowing were extremely unlikely to be paid back.

16 6. Each of the loan transactions suffered from multiple and
17 egregious deficiencies that made the high risk of loss clear. In particular,
18 each loan lacked adequate repayment sources and was undercollateralized,
19 information that Defendants knew or to which Defendants chose to turn a
20 blind eye. Moreover, Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio withheld information
21 about these deficiencies and provided exaggerated information to the other
22 members of the Loan Committee and the Board of Directors regarding
23 these Loan Transactions, thereby making the transaction appear less risky
24 than they, in fact, were.

25 7. For each of the Loan Transactions, the Defendants failed
26 to perform the independent underwriting required by the Bank's policies
27 and written agreements; failed to obtain or analyze Loan repayment
28 sources; failed to analyze the impact of project zoning and permit

1 requirements; failed to analyze or prudently analyze borrower and
2 guarantor financial information and ability to pay; and failed to
3 adequately address project viability in light of local market conditions.

4 8. Defendants' actions and inactions were particularly
5 egregious in light of the Bank's high concentration in high-risk CRE and
6 ADC loans. Defendants' recommendation and approval of poorly
7 underwritten CRE and ADC loans for projects that were in overvalued
8 markets increased the likelihood of loss to the Bank, and warranted
9 increased caution, strict adherence to loan policies, and steps to minimize
10 risk. Instead of taking such steps, Defendants' took the opposite tack,
11 ignoring the Bank's lending policies and disregarding basic principles of
12 safety and soundness to enable them to forge ahead with unsuitable loans.

13 9. The Defendants were grossly negligent, and breached
14 their fiduciary duties to the Bank by, among other things: failing to
15 conduct the required due diligence and analysis in underwriting,
16 recommending, presenting, and approving the Loan Transactions that
17 resulted in damages to the Bank; underwriting, recommending, presenting,
18 and approving the Loan Transactions in violation of the Bank's Loan
19 Standards and Administration Policy and Participation Loan Purchase
20 Policy (collectively, the "Loan Policy") and prudent, safe, and sound
21 lending practices; and failing to inform the Bank's Board of Directors
22 ("Board") of deficiencies with respect to those loans. The Defendants are
23 liable for the damages that the Bank suffered as a result of their gross
24 negligence and breaches of fiduciary duties, which includes loss of both
25 operating capital and lost investment opportunities.

26 10. The FDIC-R seeks recovery of damages caused by the
27 Defendants' gross negligence and breaches of fiduciary duties in causing
28 the Bank to violate its own policies and to violate prudent, safe, and sound

1 banking practices. In this lawsuit, the FDIC-R seeks to collect damages
2 flowing from Defendants' gross negligence and breaches of fiduciary
3 duties.

4 **II. PARTIES**

5 11. Plaintiff is the FDIC in its capacity as Receiver of the
6 Bank, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1811, et seq. Prior to its failure, the Bank was
7 insured by the FDIC. On February 27, 2009, the Bank was closed by the
8 Nevada Department of Business and Industry, Financial Institutions
9 Division ("NFID") and the FDIC was appointed as Receiver pursuant to
10 12 U.S.C. 1821(c). At that time, the FDIC-R succeeded to all the rights, titles,
11 and privileges of the Bank and its depositors, account holders, other
12 creditors, and stockholders. 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(2)(A)(i).

13 12. Defendant Kelly Jones is a former officer and director of
14 the Bank. Jones was Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") from on or about
15 October 2004, until September 25, 2008, when he resigned. Jones was a
16 director of the Bank from on or about October 2004 to January 2009. Jones
17 was a member of the Bank's Investment and Loan Committee ("Loan
18 Committee") from on or about October 2004 to June 2008. Based on
19 information and belief, Jones currently resides in Dallas, Texas.

20 13. Defendant Stephen Dervenis is a former officer and
21 director of the Bank. Dervenis was President, Chief Credit Officer ("CCO"),
22 and a director of the Bank from on or about October 2004, until
23 September 25, 2008, when he resigned. Dervenis was a member of the
24 Bank's Loan Committee from on or about October 2004 to June 2008. Based
25 on information and belief, Dervenis currently resides in Great Falls,
26 Virginia.

27 14. Defendant Thomas Procopio is a former officer of the
28 Bank. Procopio was Senior Vice President of Compliance and Loan

1 Operations/Loan Administration from on or about October 2004, until
2 December 2006, when he resigned. Procopio was a member of the Loan
3 Committee from on or about January 2005 to December 2006. Based on
4 information and belief, Procopio currently resides in Lubbock, Texas.

5 **III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

6 15. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction for this action
7 pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1811 et seq., 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(1) and (2), and
8 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1345. The FDIC is a corporation organized and
9 existing under the laws of the United States of America, and brings this
10 action in its receivership capacity. Actions to which the FDIC is a party are
11 deemed to arise under the laws of the United States. The FDIC, including
12 in its capacity as Receiver, has the authority to sue and complain in any
13 court of law, and is empowered to pursue claims held by the Bank,
14 including its claims against the Defendants. 12 U.S.C. § 1819.

15 16. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants,
16 who at all relevant times conducted business in the State of Nevada.

17 17. This Court also has personal jurisdiction over Kelly,
18 Dervenis, and Procopio under the Nevada Long-Arm Statute, Nev. Rev.
19 Stat. § 14.065, and in accordance with the Due Process Clause of the United
20 States Constitution. Kelly, Dervenis, and Procopio have sufficient contacts
21 with the State of Nevada, the causes of action herein arose from acts
22 committed by Kelly, Dervenis, and Procopio in Nevada, and those acts
23 caused injury to the Bank in Nevada. Consequently, the exercise of
24 personal jurisdiction by this Court is proper and does not offend any
25 traditional notions of fair play or substantial justice. In addition, Procopio
26 was a resident of and officed in the State of Nevada at all relevant times,
27 and this Court has personal jurisdiction over him on that basis.
28

18. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because all or substantially all of the acts charged herein occurred in this District and the FDIC-R's claims arose in this District.

IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

19. The Bank was chartered in April 2000, as an industrial loan company headquartered in Las Vegas, Nevada. In September 2004, the Bank was acquired by Stampede Holdings, Inc. ("Stampede"), a closely held company of 41 private investors. The Bank moved its headquarters from Las Vegas to Henderson, Nevada, in the fourth quarter of 2006. After Stampede acquired the Bank, the Bank focused on the nationwide purchase of loan participations, particularly ADC loans to finance condominium and CRE construction projects in high-growth markets. On February 27, 2009, NFID closed the Bank and the FDIC was appointed as Receiver of the Bank.

20. During the relevant period, between December 2004 and December 2005, the Bank's percentage of ADC loan concentrations as a percentage of total capital, grew from 17 percent to 136 percent, and by December 2006, it was 306 percent, which was more than three times the Bank's peer group average.

A. The Bank's Lending Function

21. Loan underwriting practices are the primary determinant of bank credit risk and bank credit availability, and one of the most critical aspects of loan portfolio management. Loan underwriting standards are also important in protecting bank capital, which can erode from unsafe and unsound lending practices.

22. Underwriting practices generally can be characterized by the criteria used to qualify borrowers, loan pricing, repayment terms, sources of repayment, and collateral requirements. Underwriting practices also encompass the management and administration of the loan portfolio,

1 including its growth, concentrations in specific markets or categories of
2 lending, written lending policies, and adherence to written underwriting
3 policies.

4 23. Commercial real estate ("CRE") and acquisition,
5 development, and construction ("ADC") loans are known to be more
6 speculative than other types of loans because of, among other reasons, the
7 lack of present cash flow source, uncertainties of development and sale,
8 and the need for adequate, secondary sources of repayment. Prudent
9 lending in this segment of banking requires sound underwriting, timely
10 evaluation and response to economic trends impacting the industry, and
11 strict adherence to prudent lending policies and standards. Moreover,
12 concentrating a loan portfolio in CRE/ADC loans increases a bank's risk
13 for numerous reasons, including concentration in any sector of the
14 economy increases risk resulting from that sector's downturn; the housing
15 market in particular, is cyclical by nature; the primary source of repayment
16 is cash flow from the sale of the real estate collateral; and, historically, bank
17 failure rates closely correlate with high CRE/ADC concentrations.
18 Concentrations of CRE/ADC loans in volatile commercial real estate
19 markets render a bank vulnerable to changes in market conditions and
20 require vigilant adherence to sound lending practices. It is necessary that
21 the known risks inherent in such high loan concentrations be managed by,
22 at a minimum, management oversight, strategic planning, underwriting,
23 risk assessment, and monitoring a CRE/ADC loan, portfolio risk
24 management, market analysis, and stress testing.

25 24. Regulatory agencies periodically reminded financial
26 institutions of the risks involved in CRE/ADC lending. On October 8,
27 1998, the FDIC issued Financial Institution Letter 110-98, which warned
28 financial institutions of the risk inherent in ADC lending in a favorable real

1 estate market, including an over-supply of developed property. Among
2 other things, FIL 110-98 stated that: "ADC lending is a highly specialized
3 field with inherent risks that must be managed and controlled to ensure
4 that this activity remains profitable." On December 12, 2006, the OCC,
5 FDIC, and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System jointly issued
6 "Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk
7 Management Practices," which specifically warned banks that:
8 "[c]oncentrations of credit exposure add a dimension of risk that
9 compound the risk inherent in individual loans."

10 **B. The Bank's Loan Policy**

11 25. Throughout the period relevant to the FDIC-R's claims,
12 the Bank's Loan Policy provided guidelines and requirements for
13 underwriting, recommending the approval of, and approving loans.
14 Among other things, the Loan Policy established loan documentation
15 requirements, underwriting standards, loan-to-value ("LTV") ratios,
16 characteristics of desirable and undesirable loans, and appraisal
17 requirements. The Loan Policy also required that the Bank comply with
18 FDIC rules and regulations. For real estate development loans, including
19 loan participations, the Loan Policy required a study explaining the effect
20 of property improvements on the market value of the land and a realistic
21 consideration of the finished project's marketability in favorable and
22 unfavorable market conditions.

23 26. The Loan Policy requirements were established to ensure
24 that each loan made had a strong likelihood of repayment. For example,
25 documentation and analysis of the overall financial capability and
26 resources of the borrowers and guarantors help approvers ensure loans
27 have adequate secondary sources of repayment. Analysis of the collateral,
28 including entitlements and appraisal requirements, are necessary to ensure

1 the adequate collateralization of loans, project feasibility, and timely
2 repayment.

3 27. The Bank's Loan Standards and Administration Policy
4 ("Loan Standards") applied to loan participations, and stated that the
5 Bank's underwriting practices shall: "provide for consideration, prior to
6 commitment, of the borrower's overall financial condition and resources,
7 the financial responsibility of any guarantor, the nature and value of any
8 underlying collateral, and the borrower's character and willingness to
9 repay as agreed."

10 28. The Loan Standards required that the Bank's loan officers
11 perform due diligence and that construction loans have documentation
12 showing takeout commitments. The Loan Standards provided: "proposals
13 to finance speculative housing will be based on the prospective borrower's
14 reputation, experience, and financial condition. The finished projects'
15 marketability in favorable and unfavorable market conditions shall be
16 realistically considered." The Loan Standards required guarantees who
17 could guarantee the existing and future indebtedness of the borrower.
18 Under the Loan Standards, prudent underwriting practices required
19 consideration, prior to credit commitment, of the borrower's overall
20 financial condition and resources, the financial responsibility of any
21 guarantor, the nature and value of any underlying collateral, and the
22 borrower's character and willingness to repay as agreed.

23 *Requirements for Loan Participations*

24 29. A loan participation is one in which two or more lenders
25 share in the funding of a loan to mitigate their risk related to the lending
26 relationship. In a loan participation, one lender takes a role as lead
27 servicer, typically controlling loan monitoring and having final decision-
28 making authority not extended to the other participant lenders. In return,

1 the lead lender receives a servicing fee. The lead lender will provide other
2 potential participating financial institutions with an underwriting package,
3 but sound banking practices require the participant banks to perform their
4 own independent underwriting before participating in the funding of the
5 loan.

6 30. The Bank's loan policy was consistent with this sound
7 banking practice, requiring the Bank to conduct independent underwriting.
8 Bank personnel who were involved in the lending process were to collect
9 and analyze documentation in support of proposed loan participations,
10 including, but not limited to, the following with respect to the participation
11 arrangement:

- 12 a. Full credit information on the obligor during the life
13 of the participation;
- 14 b. Any non-financial information that could help
15 determine the quality of a loan;
- 16 c. Any violations of loan covenants by the obligor; and
- 17 d. Updates in property performance, and any known
18 changes in property value.

19 31. The Loan Policy required the Bank to make a "prudent
20 credit decision" based, in part, on performance of an independent credit
21 analysis of credit quality and of the borrower and guarantor. That
22 independent credit analysis required that the Bank personnel collect and
23 analyze documentation in support of the loan, including but not limited to,
24 the following:

- 25 a. A statement of the purposes of the loan and the
26 planned repayment schedule for the loan;
- 27 b. An explanation of the disposition of the loan
28 proceeds;

- c. Financial statements of the borrower, including a statement of the frequency with which financial statements are to be provided by the borrower; and
- d. Credit reports relating to the borrower.

32. The Loan Policy also required the Bank personnel who were involved in the lending process to ensure that the Bank's loan participations were approved as part of a prudent credit decision, including, but not limited to, the following:

- a. Reviewing the loan documentation;
- b. Performing an independent analysis of credit quality;
- c. Performing an analysis of the borrower and guarantors;
- d. Performing an independent review of the appraisal;
- e. Analyzing the property operating performance; and
- f. Performing a property site inspection when warranted.

33. The Loan Policy's requirement for an analysis of credit quality included, but was not limited to, the following:

- a. The overall financial condition and resources, the financial responsibility of any guarantor, the nature and value of any underlying collateral, and the borrower's character and willingness to repay as agreed; and
- b. A financial analysis, including collateral value and cash flows.

34. The Loan Standards applied to participation loans and loan purchases, and provided that the required analysis and information

1 for such loans should be similar as that which would have been required
2 had the loan been made directly by the Bank. The Loan Standards further
3 provided that each such participation loan or loan purchase acquisition
4 decision will be independently reached following an appropriate analysis
5 to the same extent as if the loan had been made directly by the Bank.

6 *Loan Approval Structure and Limits*

7 35. Prior to May 2006, the Bank Delegations of Authority
8 Policy required joint approvals by Jones and Dervenis, followed by Loan
9 Committee approval, for loans of \$1.5 million or greater. In May 2006 until
10 at least November 2006, the Bank Delegations of Authority Policy required
11 joint approvals by Jones and Dervenis, followed by Loan Committee
12 approval, for loans of \$3 million or greater.

13 36. During the relevant period, Defendants were members of
14 the Loan Committee.

15 37. Under the Loan Policy, the Loan Committee was
16 responsible for reviewing and approving loans and loan participations
17 acquired by the Bank. For loans and loan participations requiring Loan
18 Committee approval, the Loan Committee was presented with a
19 Commercial Loan Underwriting Memorandum ("Underwriting
20 Memorandum"), which provided a summary of the loan participation,
21 description of collateral values, underwriter recommendations on loan
22 approval, and other matters. In evaluating potential loans, the Loan
23 Committee depended on the Underwriting Memorandum to contain
24 accurate information and full disclosure, and depended on the Defendants
25 to provide all relevant information and to respond accurately and with full
26 disclosure when addressing questions from the Loan Committee.

Recognition of Risks

38. At the outset, a Business Plan for the Bank was prepared in April, 2004 ("Business Plan"). Upon information and belief, FDIC-R alleges that the Business Plan was prepared by or on behalf of Defendants Jones and Dervenis. The Business Plan recognized that there were risks involved in the product strategy for the Bank, and stated that the Bank would employ superior, in-house credit and underwriting capabilities. The Business Plan stated that the Bank would closely monitor the economic and other conditions of the states in which the collateral securing the loans is located. The Business Plan also provided that prior to acquiring a loan, the Bank's in-house acquisition group will conduct a comprehensive due diligence evaluation consistent with the Bank's approved credit policy for purchasing loans.

39. As early as October, 2005, Defendants Jones and Dervenis recognized the risks to the Bank from their CRE/ADC participation loan activities. In a "Business Overview," they wrote:

- **"We may experience rapid growth in the future that could strain our limited resources.** We are thinly staffed. Our failure to effectively manage such growth could adversely affect our ability to earn profits. We are dependent on key individuals and on our continued ability to attract experienced personnel. . . ."
- **"Our business model contains inherent risk because we rely on third-party information in making lending decisions.** We buy loan participations that other banks originate and we fund loans other banks cannot fully fund due to their lending limits. As part of this process, we often rely on information provided to us by independent, third-party banks that are more familiar than we are with the markets in which the loans are originated. If such third-party information is incomplete

or inaccurate, or if we fail to adequately review such information, we may fail to realize risks in the loans we make, which could adversely affect our credit quality, resulting in a reduced ability to earn profits."

- **"Our business is subject to the success of the local economies where we operate.** Adverse economic conditions in our specific market areas could reduce our growth rate, affect the ability of our customers to repay their loans to us, and generally affect our financial condition and results of operations. Moreover, we cannot give any assurance that we will benefit from any market growth or favorable economic conditions in our primary market areas if they do occur. Adverse market or economic conditions in any of the local communities where we operate may disproportionately increase the risk that our borrowers will be unable to make their loan payments. An economic downturn could cause our interest income and net interest margin to decrease and our loan loss provision to increase, resulting in losses that materially adversely affect our business, financial condition, results of operations and cash flows. Additionally, the market value of the real estate securing loans as collateral could be adversely affected by unfavorable changes in market and economic conditions."

C. **The Defendants' Grossly Negligent Acts and Breaches of Fiduciary Duties**

40. As officers and/or directors of the Bank, the Defendants had duties to follow the Bank's Loan Policy and to exercise due care in underwriting, recommending, and approving loans and loan participations.

41. Between October 2005 and October 2006, the Defendants breached their duties by causing the Bank to approve and fund loan participations that would not have been made had the Defendants

1 complied with the Bank's Loan Policy, followed prudent, safe, and sound
 2 lending practices, and conducted the required due diligence, including
 3 undertaking basic loan review procedures.

4 42. The Defendants recommended and approved loans
 5 through their gross negligence and breaches of fiduciary duties in, among
 6 other things:

- 7 a. Failing to conduct an independent credit analysis of
- 8 each loan participation as required by the Loan
- 9 Policy;
- 10 b. Failing to conduct appropriate analyses of borrower
- 11 and guarantor financial condition, resources, and
- 12 responsibility as required by the Loan Policy,
- 13 including failing to forecast and account for
- 14 deficient borrower and guarantor liquidity, income,
- 15 or project equity.
- 16 c. Relying on outdated and unverified financial
- 17 information from borrowers and guarantors;
- 18 d. Failing to conduct appropriate analyses of the
- 19 sources of repayment, such as failing to analyze
- 20 viability of construction or take-out financing or the
- 21 likelihood of lot sales for ADC projects;
- 22 e. Failing to conduct appropriate analyses of the
- 23 nature and value of collateral, such as failing to
- 24 analyze local market conditions or zoning,
- 25 permitting, or municipal approval requirements;
- 26 f. Failing to conduct appropriate appraisal review,
- 27 such failing to analyze extraordinary assumptions;
- 28 and

- 1 g. Withholding information from the Loan Committee
2 on serious deficiencies or exaggerating attributes for
3 the Loan Committee relating to the collateral,
4 borrower, or guarantor.

5 43. These repeated violations of the Bank's Loan Policy and
6 prudent, safe, and sound lending practices occurred throughout the
7 lending process. The Defendants who engaged in underwriting and
8 recommending loan participations to the Loan Committee that caused
9 damages to the Bank were grossly negligent and breached their fiduciary
10 duties by, for example, recommending the approval of deficient loan
11 participations and failing to provide the required information and analysis
12 to support their recommendations. The Defendants who recommended
13 and provided information to the Loan Committee, and approved these
14 loan participations were grossly negligent and breached their fiduciary
15 duties by, for example, withholding information from the Loan Committee
16 on serious deficiencies or exaggerating attributes to the Loan Committee
17 relating to collateral, borrowers, or guarantors, failing to request missing
18 information, failing to heed known "red flags," and failing to reject the loan
19 participations when there were obvious, facial deficiencies.

20 44. But for the Defendants' wrongful conduct, the Bank
21 would not have approved the Loan Transactions that caused the Bank to
22 suffer over \$13.1 million in damages.

23 *Winchester Properties*

- 24 a. On or about October 11, 2005, the Loan Committee,
25 including Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio, approved
26 two participation interests for Winchester
27 Properties, LLC, and Winchester Country Club,
28 LLC. The first was a \$100,000 participation in a

1 \$66.4 million senior ADC loan, and the second was
2 a \$3.4 million participation in a \$4.8 million
3 mezzanine ADC loan (unless referred to separately,
4 the "Winchester loans"). A mezzanine loan is debt
5 subordinated to other debt issued to the same
6 borrower, meaning that it is junior to other loans
7 with regard to claims on assets or earnings. In the
8 real estate development context, mezzanine loans
9 are generally used as supplementary financing
10 when the collateral is already security for a senior
11 loan. Marshall Bank, N.A. ("Marshall") was the lead
12 lender. The Bank's \$3.4 million participation in the
13 mezzanine loan was subject to a subordination
14 agreement. Under the subordination agreement, in
15 the event that Marshall declared that the loan had
16 defaulted, the Bank was not entitled to additional
17 payments on its mezzanine loan until the senior
18 loan was paid in full.

19 45. On or about October 31, 2005, the Bank initially funded
20 the Winchester mezzanine loan in the amount of \$2,992,000. On or about
21 November 2, 2005, the Bank initially funded the Winchester senior loan in
22 the amount of \$90,555. Between October 2005 and November 2007, the
23 Bank disbursed approximately \$83,825 on the Winchester senior loan and
24 disbursed approximately \$3,400,000 on the Winchester mezzanine loan.

25 46. The purposes of the Winchester loans were to enable
26 Winchester Properties, LLC and Winchester Country Club, LLC to
27 refinance existing loans in order to complete infrastructure improvements
28 on residential lots, establish an interest reserve, and to fund closing and

1 soft costs. The residential lots were located in Meadow Vista, California,
2 which is approximately 35 to 45 miles outside of Sacramento, California.

3 47. According to the Underwriting Memoranda for the
4 Winchester loans, the repayment sources were to be proceeds from the sale
5 of lots, recovery of proceeds from collateral foreclosures, and the personal
6 guarantors' net worth, in that order. The Underwriting Memorandum for
7 the mezzanine Winchester loan also lists proceeds from the sale of the
8 country club as a primary repayment source.

9 48. By taking the \$3.4 million participation on the \$4.8 million
10 mezzanine loan, the Defendants put the Bank in a subordinate position in
11 connection with the collateral. The Bank's \$100,000 interest in the
12 Winchester senior loan was secured by: (1) a first mortgage on 161 unsold
13 or to be developed lots in phase III and phase IV of the Winchester project,
14 the golf course, and all improvements; (2) country club memberships and
15 assignment of the golf court management contract; (3) a first mortgage on
16 all tangible and intangible personal property located on or used in
17 connection with the Winchester project or its development; and (4) an
18 assignment of sale contracts and other agreements. In contrast, the Bank's
19 much larger interest in the Winchester mezzanine loan was secured only
20 by a *second* mortgage on 161 unsold or to be developed lots in phase III and
21 phase IV of the Winchester project, the golf course, club house, and all
22 improvements.

23 49. Procopio recommended, and Jones, Dervenis, and
24 Procopio approved the Winchester loans through their gross negligence
25 and breaches of fiduciary duties, which included, among other deficiencies,
26 the following.

- 27 a. The Winchester borrowers and guarantors had
28 deficient financial resources. The combined

1 borrower and guarantor liquidity was reported to
2 be only approximately \$1,574,571, which equaled
3 2.2 percent of the combined Winchester loans. In
4 addition, 2004 tax returns for the principal
5 guarantors showed negative \$3,621,978 adjusted
6 gross income and \$3,136,696 in rental real estate and
7 other losses.

- 8 b. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to verify and
9 document, as required, financial information from
10 the borrowers or guarantors.
- 11 c. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to conduct the
12 required analysis of the likelihood of lot sales or
13 factors underlying those lot sales even though the
14 Underwriting Memoranda listed lot sales as the
15 primary repayment source.
- 16 d. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to provide the
17 required analysis of market conditions relevant to
18 the Winchester project. On September 19, 2005,
19 which is less than a month before the Loan
20 Committee approved the Winchester loans,
21 Dervenis wrote to Jones and Procopio, "I know
22 nothing about the Sacramento market, this could be
23 an ideal spot or a dog, don't know."
- 24 e. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to provide the
25 required analysis of the collateral appraisal. The
26 Marshall participation prospectus estimated an
27 average sale price of \$716,864 for each unit at the
28 end of a three-year loan term in 2008 with a

1 \$573,491 release price. Conversely, the Marshall
2 prospectus further stated that of the 27 units in the
3 Winchester development sold in 2005, sale prices
4 ranged from \$310,000 to \$585,000 with an average
5 sale price of \$419,226. The difference between the
6 2005 \$419,226 average sale price and the \$716,838
7 estimated future sale price is \$297,638, which is 71
8 percent over the 2005 average sale price. The
9 difference between the 2005 \$419,226 average sale
10 price and the \$573,491 future release price is
11 \$154,265, which is 37 percent over the 2005 average
12 sale price.

- 13 f. In summary, Procopio failed to independently
14 underwrite the loan. Indeed, he copied material
15 portions of the Winchester Underwriting
16 Memoranda from the Marshall participation
17 prospectus, including portions relating to the
18 developer's background, loan strengths and
19 weaknesses, and other material topics.

20 50. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio were grossly negligent and
21 breached their fiduciary duties when they withheld from or provided
22 exaggerated information to the Loan Committee in recommending or
23 approving the Winchester loans, including, but not limited to, the
24 following.

- 25 a. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
26 the Loan Committee their failure to perform the
27 required independent credit analysis of the
28 Winchester loans.

- 1 b. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
2 the Loan Committee their failure to verify, as
3 required, the borrowers' and guarantors' financial
4 information.
- 5 c. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
6 the Loan Committee their failure to perform the
7 required analysis of repayment sources, including
8 the likelihood of lot sales.
- 9 d. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to inform the
10 Loan Committee of Dervenis's expressed ignorance
11 as to whether the market for the Winchester project
12 could be "an ideal spot or a dog." Instead, the
13 Defendants described market conditions positively
14 in the Underwriting Memoranda, including the
15 following, which Procopio copied from the
16 Marshall prospectus: "Although there are some
17 short-term concerns, including the state
18 government budget crises and declining
19 affordability, the long-term outlook for the
20 Sacramento region remains positive."
- 21 e. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio withheld from the
22 Loan Committee "red flags" in the Marshall
23 prospectus as to the collateral appraisal for
24 estimated future sale values.

25 51. Based on Procopio's recommendation, the Loan
26 Committee, including Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio, approved the
27 Winchester loans on or about October 11, 2005. Jones, Dervenis, and
28 Procopio voted to approve the Winchester loans even though underwriting

1 and credit analysis was deficient, the Defendants withheld material
2 information from the Loan Committee, and the Defendants exaggerated
3 information provided to the Loan Committee in violation of the Loan
4 Policy. The required underwriting would have demonstrated that the
5 guarantors' liquidity and income did not support the loan amount, that
6 repayment sources were vulnerable to a softening housing market, among
7 other issues, and that the Winchester loans should not have been approved.

8 52. The acts and omissions of the Defendants violated the
9 Bank's Loan Policy, as well as prudent, safe, and sound lending practices.
10 The Defendants were grossly negligent and breached their fiduciary duties
11 by recommending or approving the Winchester loans without performing
12 the required due diligence and underwriting and by withholding from or
13 providing exaggerated information to the Loan Committee.

14 53. On or about January 2007, Winchester Properties, LLC
15 and Winchester Country Club, LLC defaulted on the Winchester senior
16 loan. On or about November 2007, Winchester Properties, LLC and
17 Winchester Country Club, LLC defaulted on the Winchester mezzanine
18 loan.

19 54. Defendants' grossly negligent actions and inactions and
20 breaches of fiduciary duties with respect to the Winchester loans caused
21 damages in excess of \$3.6 million. Had the Defendants performed the
22 required due diligence, performed the required credit analysis, provided
23 complete and accurate information to the Loan Committee, and otherwise
24 complied with the Bank's Loan Policy, the Bank would not have extended
25 these loan participations to Winchester Properties, LLC and Winchester
26 Country Club, LLC and incurred the resulting damages.

WSG Key West

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55. On or about November 30, 2005, the Loan Committee, including Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio, approved a \$1.55 million participation in a \$3 million mezzanine ADC loan for WSG Key West, LLC (the "WSG Key West loan"). Marshall was the lead lender. The Bank's interest in the \$3 million mezzanine loan was subject to a subordination agreement. Under the subordination agreement, in the event that Marshall declared that the loan had defaulted, the Bank was not entitled to additional payments on its interest in the mezzanine loan until the interest holders in the senior debt were paid in full, placing the Bank in much riskier position than the senior debt holders. Between December 2005 and February 2008, the Bank disbursed approximately \$1,513,160 on its participation interest in the WSG Key West loan.

56. The purpose of the WSG Key West loan was to enable WSG Key West, LLC, to acquire property in Stock Island Key, Monroe County, Florida, for a resort development project.

57. According to the WSG Key West Underwriting Memorandum, the repayment sources were to be the proceeds from a vertical construction loan, proceeds from sale of existing marina slips, proceeds from sale of the property as is, and proceeds from conversion of the guarantors' assets, in that order.

58. The WSG Key West loan was secured by a first mortgage lien on the WSG Key West property, assignment of leases, rents, and other contracts, and a security interest in all tangible and intangible personal property located on or used in connection with the WSG Key West project and its development.

59. Jones and Procopio recommended, and Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio approved, the WSG Key West loan through their gross

1 negligence and breaches of fiduciary duties, which included, among other
2 deficiencies, the following.

- 3 a. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to provide the
4 required analysis of the guarantors'
5 creditworthiness, including an analysis of
6 contingent liabilities, liquidity, cash flow, or other
7 material issues.
- 8 b. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to verify and
9 document,, as required, financial information from
10 the borrower or the guarantors.
- 11 c. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to conduct the
12 required analysis of the likelihood of a vertical
13 construction loan even though the Underwriting
14 Memorandum listed a vertical construction loan as
15 the primary repayment source.
- 16 d. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to provide the
17 required analysis of market conditions relevant to
18 the WSG Key West project, including the status of
19 permitting requirements. The WSG Key West
20 project required additional permitting to complete
21 construction, and Monroe County had imposed a
22 building moratorium, which included the WSG Key
23 West project property.
- 24 e. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to obtain and
25 review a final appraisal prior to the Loan
26 Committee's approval of the WSG Key West loan.
- 27 f. According to an appraisal prepared two years after
28 the Loan Committee approved the WSG Key West

1 loan, the only "potential use, i.e., legally allowable
2 use, at this time is a commercial marina catering to
3 the fishing industry." The appraisal continues,
4 stating, "it could take anywhere from a year to
5 several years to obtain the necessary approvals and
6 permits to begin residential and/or mixed use
7 construction on the site with no existing units in
8 place. . . . The developer is anticipating a one year
9 period to obtain the remaining necessary approvals
10 to develop the marina portion of the project."

- 11 g. In summary, Jones and Procopio failed to
12 independently underwrite the loan. Indeed, they
13 copied material portions of the WSG Key West
14 Underwriting Memorandum from the Marshall
15 participation prospectus, including portions
16 relating to the developer's background, loan
17 strengths and weaknesses, and other material
18 topics.

19 60. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio were grossly negligent and
20 breached their fiduciary duties when they withheld from or provided
21 exaggerated information to the Loan Committee in recommending or
22 approving the WSG Key West loan, including, but not limited to, the
23 following.

- 24 a. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
25 the Loan Committee their failure to perform the
26 required independent credit analysis of the WSG
27 Key West loan.
28

- 1 b. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
2 the Loan Committee their failure to verify, as
3 required, the borrower and guarantors' financial
4 information. The Underwriting Memorandum
5 provided to the Loan Committee stated only: "They
6 are very experienced at high profile, water resort
7 condo developments[,] and provided financial
8 information for the guarantors copied from the
9 Marshall prospectus.
- 10 c. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
11 the Loan Committee their failure to perform the
12 required analysis of repayment sources, including
13 the likelihood of a vertical construction loan.
- 14 d. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to inform the
15 Loan Committee of the extent of the WSG Key West
16 project's permitting barriers. Although the
17 Underwriting Memorandum provided to the Loan
18 Committee acknowledged approval issues as a
19 "weakness," the Underwriting Memorandum
20 ultimately dismisses permitting approval issues,
21 stating: "[t]he moratorium is due primarily to the
22 evaluation of environmentally sensitive areas. This
23 particular property has been designated as a low
24 environmental concern." Two years after Jones,
25 Dervenis, and Procopio recommended and
26 approved the WSG Key West loan the only "legally
27 allowable use" was as a "commercial marina."
28 Exercising even a slight degree of care by

conducting the required due diligence would have shown that obtaining the necessary permits would potentially take years to complete.

61. Based on Jones and Procopio's recommendation, the Loan Committee, including Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio, approved the WSG Key West loan on or about November 30, 2005. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio voted to approve the WSG Key West loan even though underwriting and credit analysis was deficient, the Defendants withheld information from the Loan Committee, and the Defendants exaggerated information provided to the Loan Committee in violation of the Loan Policy. The required underwriting would have demonstrated the extent of permitting challenges, the poor likelihood of securing vertical construction financing in light of those challenges, among other issues, and that the WSG Key West loan should not have been approved.

62. The acts and omissions of the Defendants violated the Bank's Loan Policy, as well as prudent, safe, and sound lending practices. The Defendants were grossly negligent and breached their fiduciary duties by recommending or approving the WSG Key West loan without performing the required due diligence and underwriting and by withholding from or providing exaggerated information to the Loan Committee.

63. On or about February 2008, WSG Key West, LLC defaulted on the WSG Key West loan.

64. Defendants' grossly negligent actions and inactions and breaches of fiduciary duties with respect to the WSG Key West loan caused damages in excess of \$830,000. Had the Defendants performed the required due diligence, performed the required credit analysis, provided true and accurate information to the Loan Committee, and otherwise

1 complied with the Bank's Loan Policy, the Bank would not have extended
2 this loan participation to WSG Key West, LLC and incurred the resulting
3 damages.

4 *Winners, LLC (a.k.a., Beach House)*

5 65. On or about February 10, 2006, the Loan Committee,
6 including Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio, approved a \$5 million
7 participation in a \$35,630,000 senior ADC loan for Winners, LLC (the
8 "Winners, LLC loan"). Marshall was the lead lender. On or about February
9 23, 2006, the Bank initially funded its participation interest in the Winners,
10 LLC loan in the amount of \$3,708,343. Between February 2006 and
11 December 2007, the Bank disbursed approximately \$4,839,200 on its
12 participation interest in the Winners, LLC loan.

13 66. The purpose of the Winners, LLC loan was to enable
14 Winners, LLC to refinance existing debt and to fund predevelopment costs
15 for resort property in Surfside, Florida.

16 67. According to the Winners, LLC Underwriting
17 Memorandum, the repayment sources were to be proceeds from a
18 construction loan, recovery of proceeds from collateral foreclosure, and the
19 guarantors' net worth and liquidity, in that order.

20 68. The Winners, LLC loan was secured by a first lien on the
21 project property and assignment of cash flow from hotel operations.

22 69. Dervenis and Procopio recommended, and Jones,
23 Dervenis, and Procopio approved the Winners, LLC loan through their
24 gross negligence and breaches of fiduciary duties, which included, among
25 other deficiencies, the following.

- 26 a. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to provide the
27 required analysis of the guarantors'
28 creditworthiness even though the guarantors' net

1 worth was comprised primarily of real estate
2 holdings and the guarantors had limited liquidity.
3 On December 17, 2005, Jones wrote in
4 correspondence to Dervenis and Procopio, "Are we
5 comfortable with the development team – not much
6 experience in developing projects."

- 7 b. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to verify and
8 document, , as required, financial information from
9 the borrower or the guarantors.
- 10 c. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to provide the
11 required analysis of the likelihood of a construction
12 loan even though the Underwriting Memorandum
13 listed the proceeds of a construction loan as the
14 primary repayment source.
- 15 d. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to provide the
16 required analysis of market conditions relevant to
17 the Winners, LLC project, including collateral value
18 and permitting requirements. On December 17,
19 2005, Jones wrote to Dervenis, "Basically the value
20 doubled in one year? This is ridiculous." Dervenis
21 replied, "All of Florida is ridiculous. This alone
22 with no other information would scare me."
- 23 e. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to provide the
24 required analysis of the collateral appraisal,
25 including the timeline for building permits. In fact,
26 building permits were not available until September
27 2007, more than a year after the Loan Committee
28 approved the Winners, LLC loan.

- 1 f. In summary, Dervenis and Procopio failed to
2 independently underwrite the loan. Indeed, they
3 copied material portions of the Winners, LLC
4 Underwriting Memorandum from the Marshall
5 participation prospectus, including portions
6 relating to the developer's background, loan
7 strengths and weaknesses, and other material
8 topics.

9 70. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio were grossly negligent and
10 breached their fiduciary duties when they withheld from or provided
11 exaggerated information to the Loan Committee in recommending or
12 approving the Winners, LLC loan, including, but not limited to, the
13 following.

- 14 a. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
15 the Loan Committee their failure to perform the
16 required independent credit analysis of the
17 Winners, LLC loan.
- 18 b. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
19 the Loan Committee their failure to verify, as
20 required, the borrower and guarantors' financial
21 information.
- 22 c. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
23 the Loan Committee their failure to perform the
24 required analysis of repayment sources, including
25 the likelihood of proceeds from a construction loan.
- 26 d. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to inform the
27 Loan Committee about expressed reservations as to
28 the local real estate market. Instead of conveying

1 Dervenis's sentiment that "All of Florida is
2 ridiculous," the Underwriting Memorandum stated,
3 "While the once hot investor market has cooled,
4 demand by end users with accumulated wealth is
5 expected to continue. We believe the subject
6 property fits this profile." In addition, the
7 Defendants described building permits for the
8 project as a foregone conclusion, stating: "the
9 project has been fully approved by the town of
10 Surfside." The project did not receive the required
11 permits to begin construction until more than a year
12 after the Loan Committee approved the Winners,
13 LLC loan.

- 14 e. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
15 the Loan Committee their failure to perform the
16 required analysis of the collateral appraisal,
17 including the timeline for securing building
18 permits.

19 71. Based on Dervenis and Procopio's recommendation, the
20 Loan Committee, including Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio, approved the
21 Winners, LLC loan on or about February 10, 2006. Jones, Dervenis, and
22 Procopio voted to approve the Winners, LLC loan even though
23 underwriting and credit analysis was deficient, the Defendants withheld
24 material information from the Loan Committee, and the Defendants
25 exaggerated information provided to the Loan Committee in violation of
26 the Loan Policy. The required underwriting would have demonstrated the
27 extent of permitting challenges, the poor likelihood of securing
28

1 construction financing in light of those challenges, among other issues, and
2 that the Winners, LLC loan should not have been approved.

3 72. The acts and omissions of the Defendants violated the
4 Bank's Loan Policy, as well as prudent, safe, and sound lending practices.
5 The Defendants were grossly negligent and breached their fiduciary duties
6 by recommending or approving the Winners, LLC loan without
7 performing the required due diligence and underwriting and by
8 withholding from or providing exaggerated information to the Loan
9 Committee. On or about December 2007, Winners, LLC defaulted on the
10 Winners, LLC loan.

11 73. Defendants' grossly negligent actions and inactions and
12 breaches of fiduciary duties with respect to the Winners LLC loan caused
13 damages of approximately \$2,066,055. Had the Defendants performed the
14 required due diligence, performed the required credit analysis, provided
15 complete and accurate information to the Loan Committee, and otherwise
16 complied with the Bank's Loan Policy, the Bank would not have extended
17 this loan participation to Winners, LLC and incurred the resulting
18 damages.

19 *Corinthian Communities*

20 74. On or about June 20, 2006, the Loan Committee, including
21 Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio, approved a \$3 million participation in a
22 \$19,040,000 ADC loan for Corinthian Communities, Inc. (the "Corinthian
23 loan"). Marshall was the lead lender. On or about June 27, 2006, the Bank
24 initially funded its participation interest in the Corinthian loan for the
25 amount of \$1,658,476. Between June 2006 and December 2008, the Bank
26 disbursed approximately \$2,089,427 on its participation interest in the
27 Corinthian loan.
28

1 75. The purpose of the Corinthian loan was to enable
2 Corinthian Communities, Inc. to acquire a 127-acre parcel of vacant land
3 near Star, Idaho, for a planned residential community.

4 76. According to the Corinthian Underwriting
5 Memorandum, the repayment sources were to be proceeds from a
6 construction loan from Marshall, proceeds from conversion of the
7 guarantors' assets, and proceeds from the bulk sale of collateral, in that
8 order.

9 77. The Corinthian loan was secured by a first deed of trust
10 on the project property.

11 78. Dervenis and Procopio recommended, and Jones,
12 Dervenis, and Procopio approved, the Corinthian loan through their gross
13 negligence and breaches of fiduciary duties, which included, among other
14 deficiencies, the following.

- 15 a. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to provide the
16 required analysis of the guarantors'
17 creditworthiness even though that the guarantors'
18 liquidity was approximately 7/100th of 1 percent
19 (0.07%) of the guarantors' net worth and 1.58
20 percent of the overall Corinthian loan amount. On
21 May 30, 2006, Dervenis wrote to Procopio, "How in
22 the world can you have 400+mm net worth and
23 \$200k in liquidity?"
- 24 b. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to verify and
25 document, as required, financial information from
26 the borrower or guarantors. Jones, Dervenis, and
27 Procopio also relied on outdated financial
28 information. Tax returns of the guarantors that

1 were available when the Defendants recommended
2 or approved the Corinthian loan in June 2006 were
3 for 2003 and 2004, but not 2005. Unaudited
4 financial statements were also listed as of June 2005
5 and December 2005.

- 6 c. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to provide the
7 required analysis of the likelihood of a construction
8 loan even though the Underwriting Memorandum
9 listed "Construction loan by Marshall BankFirst" as
10 the primary repayment source.
- 11 d. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to provide the
12 required analysis of market conditions relevant to
13 the Corinthian project, including "red flags" and
14 building approvals. The purchase agreement and
15 other documents suggested a non-arms' length
16 relationship between the buyer and seller that
17 resulted in an inflated purchase price for the
18 Corinthian property. The Defendants also failed to
19 consider the timing relating to building approvals.
20 The Underwriting Memorandum that Dervenis and
21 Procopio prepared for the Loan Committee stated
22 that the subdivision had "preliminary plat map
23 approval" "which allows the development as
24 planned." However, preliminary approval still
25 required subsequent approvals, which would
26 ultimately delay project development by more than
27 a year.
28

- 1 e. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to provide the
2 required analysis of the collateral appraisal,
3 including the timeline for building approvals.
4 f. In summary, Dervenis and Procopio failed to
5 independently underwrite the loan. Indeed, they
6 copied material portions of the Corinthian
7 Underwriting Memoranda from the Marshall
8 participation prospectus, including portions
9 relating to the developer's background, loan
10 strengths and weaknesses, and other material
11 topics.

12 79. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio were grossly negligent and
13 breached their fiduciary duties when they withheld from or provided
14 exaggerated information to the Loan Committee in recommending or
15 approving the Corinthian loan, including, but not limited to, the following.

- 16 a. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
17 the Loan Committee their failure to perform the
18 required independent credit analysis of the
19 Corinthian loan.
20 b. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
21 the Loan Committee their failure to verify, as
22 required, the borrower and guarantors' financial
23 information. The Corinthian Underwriting
24 Memorandum provided to the Loan Committee
25 offers only general information as to the guarantors'
26 background and financial information even though
27 the guarantors' liquidity was approximately
28 7/100th of 1 percent of the guarantors' net worth

1 and 1.58 percent of the overall Corinthian loan
2 amount. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio also failed
3 to inform the Loan Committee of Dervenis's
4 reservations as to the guarantors' liquidity, instead
5 describing as a mitigating factor to the guarantors'
6 low liquidity the guarantors' purported access to
7 high corporate liquidity. However, the corporation
8 at issue was not a formal guarantor and had no
9 obligation to supply funds to the actual guarantors.

- 10 c. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
11 the Loan Committee their failure to perform the
12 required analysis of repayment sources, including
13 the likelihood of a construction loan from Marshall.
14 d. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
15 the Loan Committee the "red flags" associated with
16 collateral value described above and that they
17 exaggerated information relating to building
18 approval.
19 e. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
20 the Loan Committee their failure to perform the
21 required analysis of the collateral appraisal.

22 80. Based on Dervenis and Procopio's recommendation, the
23 Loan Committee, including Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio, approved the
24 Corinthian loan on or about June 20, 2006. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio
25 voted to approve the Corinthian loan even though underwriting and credit
26 analysis was deficient, the Defendants withheld material information from
27 the Loan Committee, and the Defendants exaggerated information
28 provided to the Loan Committee in violation of the Loan Policy. The

1 required underwriting would have demonstrated the extent of the
2 guarantors' poor liquidity, "red flags" as to risks of inflated collateral value,
3 the poor likelihood of securing construction financing from Marshall in
4 light of those challenges, among other issues, and that the Corinthian loan
5 should not have been approved.

6 81. The acts and omissions of the Defendants violated the
7 Bank's Loan Policy, as well as prudent, safe, and sound lending practices.
8 The Defendants were grossly negligent and breached their fiduciary duties
9 by recommending or approving the Corinthian loan without performing
10 the required due diligence and underwriting and by withholding from or
11 providing exaggerated information to the Loan Committee.

12 82. Defendants' grossly negligent actions and inactions and
13 breaches of fiduciary duties with respect to the Corinthian loan caused
14 damages in excess of \$2.26 million. Had the Defendants performed the
15 required due diligence, performed the required credit analysis, provided
16 complete and accurate information to the Loan Committee, and otherwise
17 complied with the Bank's Loan Policy, the Bank would not have extended
18 this loan participation to Corinthian Communities, Inc. and incurred the
19 resulting damages.

20 *Northshore Center*

21 83. On or about July 5, 2006, the Loan Committee, including
22 Jones and Dervenis, approved a \$5 million participation in a \$26,210,000
23 ADC loan for Northshore Center THC, LLC (the "Northshore loan").
24 Marshall was the lead lender. On or about July 10, 2006, the Bank initially
25 funded its participation interest in the Northshore loan in the amount of
26 \$3,723,188.99. Between July 2006 and June 2008, the Bank disbursed
27 approximately \$4,864,284 on its participation interest in the Northshore
28 loan.

1 84. The purpose of the Northshore loan was to enable
2 Northshore Center THC, LLC to refinance existing debt and fund
3 predevelopment site costs for a condominium and retail development
4 project in Northbrook Village, Illinois. Northbrook Village is a suburb of
5 Chicago, Illinois.

6 85. According to the Northshore Underwriting
7 Memorandum, the repayment sources were to be proceeds from
8 refinancing with "construction mini-perm" and proceeds from liquidation
9 of the guarantors' personal assets, in that order.

10 86. The Northshore loan was secured by a first mortgage on
11 the Northshore project property and all improvements and assignment of
12 sales contracts, earnest money deposits, and other amounts.

13 87. Procopio recommended, and Jones and Dervenis
14 approved, the Northshore loan through their gross negligence and
15 breaches of fiduciary duties, which included, among other deficiencies, the
16 following.

- 17 a. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to provide the
18 required analysis of the guarantors'
19 creditworthiness even though the guarantors had
20 negative adjusted gross income for the 2005 tax
21 year, as well as a poor credit history. Jones,
22 Dervenis, and Procopio also failed to assess "red
23 flags" relating to past credit history and financing,
24 including, as described in the Underwriting
25 Memorandum, that the borrower "was forced to
26 finance the acquisition with an expensive hard
27 money loan from a wealthy individual."
28

- 1 b. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to verify and
2 document, as required, financial information from
3 the borrower or guarantors. The Underwriting
4 Memorandum that Procopio prepared for the Loan
5 Committee offered only information copied from
6 the Marshall prospectus or received from Marshall.
7 For example, as to a guarantor's credit score, the
8 Underwriting Memorandum stated only, "Not that
9 we are stating this is true, but [it] is the borrowers
10 [sic] statement." Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio
11 failed to verify financial information despite the
12 individual guarantors having negative adjusted
13 gross income from between \$33,445 and \$141,257
14 and, in the case of a corporate guarantor, \$2,212,970
15 in ordinary business losses for the 2005 tax year.
- 16 c. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to provide the
17 required analysis of the likelihood of a construction
18 loan even though the Underwriting Memorandum
19 listed the proceeds of a refinanced construction loan
20 as the primary repayment source.
- 21 d. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to provide the
22 required analysis of market conditions relevant to
23 the Northshore project, including zoning
24 requirements. Land and air rights and zoning
25 approvals were necessary for project success and
26 the Underwriting Memorandum describes them as
27 a foregone conclusion. The developers were never
28 able to secure those land and air rights or the

1 necessary municipal approvals. Jones, Dervenis,
2 and Procopio also failed to evaluate, as required,
3 local market conditions relating to pre-sold
4 condominium units. The Underwriting
5 Memorandum makes numerous references to the
6 pre-sale of 35 of the "up to 112" condominium units
7 with "10% non-refundable deposits." However,
8 under Illinois law, those deposits were fully
9 refundable.

- 10 e. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to provide the
11 required analysis of the collateral appraisal,
12 including the land and air rights and zoning issues.
13 The appraisal stated that the final agreements for
14 the land and air rights were preliminary. The
15 Underwriting Memorandum stated, however, that
16 the borrower had obtained the land and air rights
17 and indicated that zoning approvals were a
18 foregone conclusion.
- 19 f. In summary, Procopio failed to independently
20 underwrite the loan. Indeed, he copied material
21 portions of the Northshore Underwriting
22 Memoranda from the Marshall participation
23 prospectus, including portions relating to the
24 developer's background, loan strengths and
25 weaknesses, and other material topics.

26 88. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio were grossly negligent and
27 breached their fiduciary duties when they withheld from or provided
28 exaggerated information to the Loan Committee in recommending or

1 approving the Northshore loan, including, but not limited to, the
2 following.

- 3 a. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
4 the Loan Committee their failure to perform the
5 required independent credit analysis of the
6 Northshore loan.
- 7 b. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
8 the Loan Committee their failure to verify, as
9 required, the borrower and guarantors' financial
10 information. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio
11 dismissed "red flags" as to the guarantors'
12 creditworthiness, instead stating in the
13 Underwriting Memorandum: "Highly desirable
14 location! Have to go to the three most important
15 factors of Commercial Real Estate, location,
16 location, location."
- 17 c. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
18 the Loan Committee their failure to perform the
19 required analysis of repayment sources, including
20 the likelihood of proceeds from a construction loan.
- 21 d. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio exaggerated
22 information to the Loan Committee as to local real
23 estate market conditions and overstated the value of
24 deposits on pre-sales, since those deposits were
25 fully refundable.
- 26 e. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
27 the Loan Committee their failure to perform the
28 required analysis of the collateral appraisal,

1 including misstating that the borrower had
2 obtained the land and air rights and that zoning
3 approvals were a foregone conclusion.

4 89. Based on Procopio's recommendation, the Loan
5 Committee, including Jones and Dervenis approved the Northshore loan
6 on or about July 5, 2006. Jones and Dervenis voted to approve the
7 Northshore loan even though underwriting and credit analysis was
8 deficient, the Defendants failed to provide complete and accurate
9 information to the Loan Committee in violation of the Loan Policy. The
10 required underwriting would have demonstrated the extent of approval
11 challenges, the poor likelihood of securing construction financing in light
12 of those challenges, among other issues, and that the Northshore loan
13 should not have been approved.

14 90. The acts and omissions of the Defendants violated the
15 Bank's Loan Policy, as well as prudent, safe, and sound lending practices.
16 The Defendants were grossly negligent and breached their fiduciary duties
17 by recommending or approving the Northshore loan without performing
18 the required due diligence and underwriting and by withholding from or
19 providing exaggerated information to the Loan Committee.

20 91. Defendants' grossly negligent actions and inactions and
21 breaches of fiduciary duties with respect to the Northshore loan caused
22 damages in excess of \$3.4 million. Had the Defendants performed the
23 required due diligence, performed the required credit analysis, provided
24 complete and accurate information to the Loan Committee, and otherwise
25 complied with the Bank's Loan Policy, the Bank would not have extended
26 this loan participation to Northshore Center THC, LLC and incurred the
27 resulting damages.
28

Hisey, LLC

92. On or about October 4, 2006, the Loan Committee, including Jones, Dervenis, Procopio, approved a \$3,748,500 participation in a \$4,165,000 ADC loan for Hisey, LLC (the "Hisey, LLC loan"). First Mutual Bank was the lead lender. On or about November 2006, the Loan Committee approved the Bank's acquisition of the remaining portion of the Hisey, LLC loan, increasing the Bank's total participation interest to \$4,165,000. On or about November 22, 2006, the Bank initially funded its participation interest in the Hisey, LLC loan in the amount of \$635,315. Between November 2006 and October 2007, the Bank disbursed approximately \$1,541,119 on its participation interest in the Hisey, LLC loan.

93. The purpose of the Hisey, LLC loan was to enable Hisey, LLC to acquire and develop a residential community project near Lake Stevens, Washington.

94. According to the Hisey Underwriting Memorandum, the repayment sources were to be proceeds from the sale of finished lots or funds from the guarantors' assets, in that order.

95. The Hisey, LLC loan was secured by a first deed of trust on project property.

96. Dervenis and Procopio recommended, and Jones, Dervenis, Procopio approved, the Hisey, LLC loan through their gross negligence and breaches of fiduciary duties, which included, among other deficiencies, the following.

- a. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to provide the required analysis of the guarantors' creditworthiness even though the guarantors' net worth was principally comprised of unrealized gain

1 from incomplete real estate development projects.
2 Additionally, a large portion of the guarantors' net
3 worth was from earnest money deposits. If the
4 development projects were not completed, the
5 earnest money deposits would have been returned
6 and the net worth attributed to the unrealized gain
7 would never have materialized. A guarantor also
8 had \$684,702 in gambling losses in 2005.

- 9 b. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to verify and
10 document, as required, financial information from
11 the borrower or guarantors. The guarantors' net
12 worth was principally comprised of unrealized gain
13 from incomplete real estate development projects
14 and earnest money deposits. Defendants' failed to
15 conduct and document any analysis or verification
16 of these real estate holdings and projects.
- 17 c. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to provide the
18 required analysis of the lot sales even though the
19 Underwriting Memorandum listed lot sales as the
20 primary repayment source. Among other things,
21 Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio ignored red flags that
22 made clear that the finished lots were unlikely to
23 serve as a sufficient repayment source. The
24 appraisal's "at completion" valuation assumed an
25 average lot price of \$175,000." On October 3, 2006,
26 Procopio wrote to Dervenis, "IF THE LOTS ARE
27 [\$]175K VALUE AND ARE GOING TO BE SOLD
28 AROUND THAT PRICE TO A DEVELOPER, HOW

1 IN THE WORLD ARE THEY GOING TO SELL
2 HOUSES AT THE [\$]300K-400K LEVEL ... BEFORE
3 PROFIT MARGIN TO THE BUILDER YOU WILL
4 BE OVER [\$]400K. SOMETHING MUST BE
5 WRONG" Defendants failed to conduct any further
6 analysis and failed to reveal this "red flag" in the
7 Underwriting Memorandum.

- 8 d. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to provide the
9 required analysis of the extraordinary assumptions
10 in the appraisal for the lots, including that the lot
11 sales would occur by Spring 2007, and that lots
12 would be completed and sold within six to eight
13 months after the October 2006 loan approval. In
14 fact, the developer was not able to obtain
15 *preliminary* plat approval until June 2007, much less
16 finish building by that time. As Procopio noted in
17 the Hisey Appraisal Review Form, without these
18 extraordinary assumptions, the LTV ratio was 236
19 percent, which far exceeded the 80 percent LTV
20 ratio ceiling in the Bank's Loan Policy.
- 21 e. In summary, Dervenis and Procopio failed to
22 independently underwrite the loan. Indeed, they
23 copied material portions of the Hisey Underwriting
24 Memoranda from the First Mutual Bank
25 participation prospectus, including portions
26 relating to the developer's background, loan
27 strengths and weaknesses, and other material
28 topics.

1 97. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio were grossly negligent and
2 breached their fiduciary duties when they withheld from or provided
3 exaggerated information to the Loan Committee in recommending or
4 approving the Hisey, LLC loan, including, but not limited to, the following.

- 5 a. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
6 the Loan Committee their failure to perform an the
7 required independent credit analysis of the Hisey,
8 LLC loan.
- 9 b. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
10 the Loan Committee their failure to verify, as
11 required, the borrower and guarantors' financial
12 information. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio also
13 withheld from the Loan Committee that the
14 guarantors' net worth was principally comprised of
15 unrealized gains from incomplete real estate
16 projects and earnest money deposits.
- 17 c. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
18 the Loan Committee their failure to perform the
19 required analysis of repayment sources, including
20 the likelihood of lot sales.
- 21 d. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio withheld information
22 to the Loan Committee as to local real estate market
23 conditions. An average lot price of \$175,000 was
24 required to support the appraiser's valuation "at
25 completion." However, the \$175,000 average lot
26 price would have made it economically unfeasible
27 to achieve the target median new home price of
28 \$344,990 described in the Underwriting

1 Memorandum. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio did
2 not describe that "red flag" to the Loan Committee.

- 3 e. Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio failed to disclose to
4 the Loan Committee the extraordinary assumptions
5 in the appraisal and their failure to perform the
6 required analysis of the collateral appraisal.

7 98. Based on Dervenis and Procopio's recommendation, the
8 Loan Committee, including Jones, Dervenis, and Procopio, approved the
9 Hisey, LLC loan on or about October 4, 2006. Jones, Dervenis, and
10 Procopio voted to approve the Hisey, LLC loan even though underwriting
11 and credit analysis was deficient, the Defendants withheld material
12 information from the Loan Committee, and the Defendants exaggerated
13 information to the Loan Committee in violation of the Loan Policy. The
14 required underwriting would have demonstrated the extent of construction
15 schedule challenges, among other issues, and that the Hisey, LLC loan
16 should not have been approved.

17 99. The acts and omissions of the Defendants violated the
18 Bank's Loan Policy, as well as prudent, safe, and sound lending practices.
19 The Defendants were grossly negligent and breached their fiduciary duties
20 by recommending or approving the Hisey, LLC loan without performing
21 the required due diligence and underwriting and by withholding from or
22 providing exaggerated information to the Loan Committee. On or about
23 October 2007, Hisey, LLC defaulted on the Hisey, LLC loan. Defendants'
24 grossly negligent actions and inactions and breaches of fiduciary duties
25 with respect to the Hisey LLC loan caused damages in excess of \$900,000.
26 Had the Defendants performed the required due diligence, performed the
27 required credit analysis, provided complete and accurate information to
28 the Loan Committee, and otherwise complied with the Bank's Loan Policy,

1 the Bank would not have extended this loan participation to Hisey, LLC
2 and incurred the resulting damages.

3 **V. CAUSES OF ACTION**

4 **COUNT I – BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES**

5 **(All Defendants)**

6 100. The FDIC-R re-alleges and incorporates by reference the
7 allegations contained in paragraphs 1-82 above as if fully set out in this
8 Count.

9 101. As officers and directors of the Bank, at all times, the
10 Defendants owed to the Bank fiduciary duties of care and loyalty,
11 including duties of honesty, full disclosure, and the obligation to exercise
12 their powers in good faith and with a view to the interests of the Bank.

13 102. As part of their fiduciary duties, the Defendants had a
14 duty to inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all
15 material information reasonably available to them, and to act with requisite
16 care in the discharge of their duties.

17 103. This duty included, among other things: conducting the
18 business of the Bank in a manner consistent with safe and sound lending
19 practices; using prudent procedures for underwriting, recommending
20 approval of loans, and approving loans; underwriting, recommending
21 approval of loans, and approving loans in accordance with the Bank's Loan
22 Policy; and ensuring that the Bank's Loan Committee had complete and
23 accurate information regarding all aspects of proposed loans.

24 104. For each loan, this information to be provided and
25 analyzed included, among other things, the value and sufficiency of
26 collateral, the financial creditworthiness of the borrowers and guarantors,
27 the LTV ratio, and any other information necessary to ensure that proposed
28

1 loans complied with the Bank's Loan Policy and prudent, safe, and sound
2 lending practices.

3 105. The Bank reasonably reposed trust and confidence in
4 each of the Defendants and believed they would exercise the trust and
5 confidence reposed in them with great care.

6 106. The Defendants each knew or should have known that
7 the Bank was placing its trust and confidence in them, and the Bank did
8 place its trust and confidence in each of them, as demonstrated by each of
9 the Defendants being an officer and/or a director of the Bank and taking
10 on responsibility with respect to the underwriting, recommendation,
11 and/or approval of loans. Trust and confidence was also placed in the
12 Defendants because they either assisted in preparing, publicizing and/or
13 enforcing the terms of the Bank's Loan Policy, or because each of them had
14 read and agreed to follow the Bank's Loan Policy.

15 107. With respect to the loans discussed in this Complaint,
16 each of the Defendants possessed significant access to relevant knowledge
17 and facts due to their special position of power at the Bank and the
18 confidence they invited others to repose in them with respect to such loans,
19 based on the fact that these individuals actively engaged in the
20 underwriting, recommendation, and/or approval of the loans.

21 108. As officers and/or directors of the Bank, and as
22 individuals underwriting, recommending, and/or approving the loans
23 discussed in this Complaint, each of the Defendants was in a special
24 position of influence and power, and each of them exercised that influence
25 and power in a manner that directly caused harm to the Bank.

26 109. The Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the
27 Bank by committing the acts and omissions alleged above and, among
28 other things:

- a. Failing to conduct the business and affairs of the Bank in compliance with all applicable the Bank policies, including the Loan Policy, and prudent, safe, and sound principles of banking;
- b. Failing to follow safeguards to prevent the Bank from incurring damages;
- c. Failing to follow policies and procedures to protect the financial stability of the Bank, and failing to take steps to mitigate or lessen damages to the Bank;
- d. Failing to follow prudent and non-grossly negligent procedures for underwriting and approving the Bank's loans;
- e. Causing the Bank's Loan Committee to approve and fund loans in violation of its policies, including the Loan Policy, and prudent lending practices;
- f. Causing the Bank's Loan Committee to approve and fund loans based on deficient collateral securing the loans;
- g. Causing the Bank's Loan Committee to approve and fund loans based on deficient, incomplete, inaccurate, or unrealistic appraisals of collateral;
- h. Causing the Bank's Loan Committee to approve and fund loans without requiring adequate sources of repayment and/or adequate non-collateral security;
- i. Causing the Bank's Loan Committee to approve and fund loans without performing the required analysis of the repayment ability and creditworthiness of borrowers and guarantors; and

1 j. Causing the Bank's Loan Committee to approve and
2 fund imprudently structured loans.

3 110. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants'
4 breaches of fiduciary duties, Plaintiff has suffered damages in excess of
5 \$13.1 million. The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this Complaint to
6 describe additional damages.

7 **COUNT II – GROSS NEGLIGENCE**
8 **(All Defendants)**

9 111. The FDIC-R re-alleges and incorporates by reference the
10 allegations contained in paragraphs 1-93 above as if fully set out in this
11 Count.

12 112. Under Nevada law and 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k), as officers
13 and/or directors of the Bank, the Defendants can be held personally liable
14 for loss or damage to the Bank caused by their gross negligence.

15 113. As officers and/or directors of the Bank, at all times, the
16 Defendants owed to the Bank a duty to not be grossly negligent.

17 114. This duty included, among other things: conducting the
18 business of the Bank in a manner consistent with safe and sound lending
19 practices; avoiding gross negligence in underwriting, recommending
20 approval of loans, and approving loans; underwriting, recommending
21 approval of loans, and approving loans in accordance with the Bank's Loan
22 Policy; and ensuring that the Bank's Loan Committee had complete and
23 accurate information regarding all aspects of proposed loans.

24 115. For each loan, this information to be provided and
25 analyzed included, among other things, the value and sufficiency of
26 collateral, the financial creditworthiness of the borrower, the LTV ratio,
27 and any other information necessary to ensure that proposed loans
28

1 complied with the Bank's Loan Policy and prudent, safe, and sound
2 lending practices.

3 116. The Defendants breached their duties and were grossly
4 negligent by committing the grossly negligent acts and omissions alleged
5 above and, among other things:

- 6 a. Failing to conduct the business and affairs of the
7 Bank in compliance with all applicable the Bank
8 policies, including the Bank's Loan Policy, and
9 prudent, safe, and sound principles of banking;
- 10 b. Failing to follow safeguards to prevent the Bank
11 from incurring damages;
- 12 c. Failing to follow policies and procedures to protect
13 the financial stability of the Bank, and failing to take
14 steps to mitigate or lessen damages to the Bank;
- 15 d. Failing to follow, prudent and non-grossly
16 negligent procedures for underwriting and
17 approving the Bank's loans;
- 18 e. Causing the Bank's Loan Committee to approve and
19 fund loans in violation of its policies, including its
20 written loan policies, and prudent lending practices;
- 21 f. Causing the Bank's Loan Committee to approve and
22 fund loans based on deficient collateral securing the
23 loans;
- 24 g. Causing the Bank's Loan Committee to approve and
25 fund loans based on deficient, incomplete,
26 inaccurate, or unrealistic appraisals of collateral;
- 27
- 28

- h. Causing the Bank's Loan Committee to approve and fund loans without requiring adequate sources of repayment and/or adequate non-collateral security;
- i. Causing the Bank's Loan Committee to approve and fund loans without performing the required analysis of the repayment ability and creditworthiness of borrowers and guarantors; and
- j. Causing the Bank's Loan Committee to approve and fund imprudently structured loans.

117. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' gross negligence, Plaintiff has suffered damages in excess of \$13.1 million. The Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this Complaint to describe additional damages.

VI. RELIEF REQUESTED

WHEREFORE, the FDIC-R demands a trial by jury and judgment in its favor and against the Defendants as follows:

118. Determining the amount of damages caused by the Defendants;

119. Determining the amount of accrued interest (including pre-judgment interest) on such damages;

120. Awarding the FDIC-R the full amount of damages and accrued interest;

121. Awarding the FDIC-R its costs and other expenses incurred by it in connection with this proceeding; and

122. Granting the FDIC-R such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper under the circumstances.

VII. JURY DEMAND

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38, the FDIC-R demands a jury trial

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